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DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Implementation of NSDD 19 on Protection of NSC and Intelligence Information

1. The President has signed NSDD 19 on protection of sensitive information (copy attached). Mr. Clark, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs has been directed to establish the detailed procedures to implement policies. Mr. Clark has directed me to develop similar procedures for protection of sensitive classified intelligence information and submit draft procedures by February 15, 1982.

2. My implementing procedures are attached. We will discuss this issue at an early NFIC meeting.

William J. Casey

Attachment:

Proposed Procedures

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## DCI DRAFT PROCEDURES REGARDING PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

The following is issued in response to the instructions of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to prepare procedures for protection of sensitive classified intelligence similar to those established in accordance with NSDD 19 for protection of NSC information.

### Sensitive Classified Intelligence

Sensitive Classified Intelligence includes (1) all information bearing SCI special Community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future Community intelligence collection programs and their end products for which Community systems of compartmentation have been or will be formally established, (2) all DDO/CIA's Blue Border series material, (3) those Special Access Programs related to intelligence established by department heads in accordance with provisions of E.O. 12065.

### Contacts with the News Media

There should be no reason for intelligence officials to discuss classified intelligence with the news media. In those rare cases where it is deemed essential for an intelligence officer to meet with the press, approval will be required in advance by a Senior Intelligence Official (a member of NFIB or NFIC). No approval will be given to discuss classified intelligence matters. Subsequent to the approved interview an administrative memorandum will be forwarded to the SIO. If in his discretion it is appropriate, a copy will be furnished to the DCI.

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Access and Investigation

Agencies that handle sensitive intelligence information will keep the number of individuals with access to such information to the absolute minimum. While the restriction on billets has been removed, it is incumbent on SIOs to ensure that inertia and out-dated justifications do not contribute to automatic access by individuals who have no need-to-know.

Agencies will strictly control document dissemination in both hard copy and by electrical means. Dissemination practices are to be critically reviewed by SIOs toward a goal of eliminating repetition and redundancy. A strict application and rejustification of need-to-know is required. SIOs are directed to personally review current dissemination practices and procedures and report to the DCI by 1 April 1982 on actions taken to reduce distribution.

Cover sheets will continue to be used on sensitive intelligence information.

The signature of an individual on a nondisclosure of intelligence agreement is considered sufficient to make that individual subject to investigation by all legal means including, the polygraph, in the event of unauthorized disclosure. Nondisclosure agreements are to be revised to include explicitly the provisions of NSDD 19 for investigation by all legal means, including polygraph.

SIOs are directed to conduct timely internal investigations when they determine that an unauthorized disclosure has occurred of material in their custody. All such determinations of unauthorized disclosure shall be reported

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to the DCI. The DCI will refer significant unauthorized disclosures to the Justice Department requesting investigation. In the event of an investigation directed by Justice Department and conducted by the FBI, the FBI is to be provided access to the full scope of internal investigation results. The FBI will have the authority to conduct polygraph examinations incident to investigations for those agencies which lack a polygraph capability.

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